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Although economies, business practices, and living standards have converged since WWII, 
corporate structures continue to differ among the advanced economies of the world. 
Looking at the diversity of corporate structures of large-sized firms around the world (and 
over time) would fascinate Charles Darwin. This work develops a critical review of the 
literature on political determinants of corporate governance through the Darwinian theory 
(including some Lamarckian aspects). As Darwin, in his work On the Origin of Species, 
explicates the diversity of species of tortoises, finches, and iguanas of the Galapagos 
Islands, so Darwinism may contribute in understanding the origin and the persistence of 
corporate diversity. In particular, this article takes into account politics-driven variations, 
their inheritances, and the subsequent selection of advantageous ‘corporate’ attributes. 
 
JEL Code: G30, K22, J50 
Keywords: Corporate governance, Darwin, politics, path-dependency. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Assistant professor of Law and Economics—Brenno Galli Chair of Economic Analysis of Law, Università della Svizzera italiana, 
Lugano (Switzerland), email: vatierom@usi.ch. The author acknowledges comments from Filippo Belloc, Peter Gourevitch, 
Eleonora Guadagno, Yuliya Guseva, Giuseppe Niglia, Ugo Pagano, Marcello Puca, Mark Roe, Hans-Bernd Schäfer, Mathias Siems, 
Holger Spamann, two anonymous referees of this journal, and participants of EALE 2013 (Warsaw), EALE 2014 (Marseille), and 
WINIR 2014 (Greenwich) conferences. I am grateful for financial support provided by the Swiss National Science Foundation and 
for the visiting fellowship of the Comparative Corporate Governance and Finance Program at Harvard Law School. The usual 
disclaimers apply. 
	  	   	  2	  	  	  	  	  
 
 
“O Nature, O Nature, 
Why do you not then give 
That which you promised then?  
Why to such a degree 
Do you beguile your children?” 





Darwinism is a theory of the diversity of species (Mayr 1988: 265). The corporate 
diversity around the world and over time would fascinate Charles Darwin. There are at 
least two species of corporate governance in large-sized corporations: 1  one—the 
diffused shareholder species—is characterised by anonymous shareholding and thick, 
liquid trading markets, and relations among actors of firms are coordinated primarily via 
highly competitive market arrangements; the second one—the blockholder species—
relies on strict control exerted over the management by a principal shareholder and on 
collusive and non-market interactions among stakeholders. 2  Most of the world’s 
economy operates through the blockholder species. The diffuse shareholder species 
found in the US is relatively unusual, and even in the US, it is of rather recent origin (cf. 
(La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2008—hereinafter LLSV; Gourevitch 
1996). Moreover, countries have not simply held to one system but have changed over 
time.3  
This work, in accordance with the so-called ‘politics-school’ (Roe 1994, 2003, 2005, 
2006; Gourevitch 2003; Rajan and Zingales 2003; Pagano and Volpin 2005; Gourevitch 
and Shinn 2005; Perotti and von Thadden 2006; Pagano 2012; Belloc and Pagano 2013; 
Roe and Vatiero 2016), originated by the contributions of Veblen, Berle and Means, 
analyses the corporation as mostly a ‘political construct’;4 this means that corporate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This work focuses on public companies because they are the “most politically salient firms in every jurisdiction” 
(Davies et al. 2009:306) and because the institutional differences in corporate governance are more evident in large 
(the largest) business firms than medium or small firms—La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2008) find 
that this is indeed the case. 
2 These two models of corporate governance are named, e.g., the neoliberal model vs. the Rhenis-Alpine-Japanese 
model (Albert 1990), outsider model vs. insider model (Franks and Mayer 1995), market-system vs. hierarchical-
control system (Allen and Gale 2000), common-law vs. civil-law (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002, 
2008), Anglo-American corporate governance vs. Continental European corporate governance (Aguilera and Jackson 
2003), and external diffuse shareholder model vs. internal concentrated blockholder model (Gourevitch and Shinn 
2005).  
3 As documented by Pagano and Volpin (2005), and Pagano and Volpin (2006), who extended the LLSV indicator up 
to 2002. Evidence also comes from longitudinal studies of ownership concentration in specific countries (e.g. Barca 
and Becht 2001; Morck 2005).  
4 Adolph Berle writes in the preface of The Modern Corporation and the Private Property: “Corporations are 
essentially political constructs.” (Berle and Means 1932:xxxviii). The path-breaking contribution of Thorstein Veblen 
is recognised by Berle and Means: in the first footnote of their book, authors write that for Veblen, corporations are 
“master instruments of civilization”.  
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governance arrangements inside the firm among constituents (in particular, managers, 
owners, and workers) interact deeply with a nation’s politics (cf. Roe 2003). In this 
respect, party systems, political institutions, political orientations of governments, 
distributional coalitions, ideologies, and interest groups are the primary determinants of 
the relationships among managers, owners, workers, and other stakeholders of the firm; 
by this token, political forces account for the differences of corporate governance 
species among advanced industrial countries. This analysis based on politics is not the 
usual interpretation:5 politics is generally considered an exogenous factor of corporate 
governance in the standard literature (see Coffee 2001); on the contrary, this article 
affirms that not only does politics affect the corporate governance species, but also that 
politics depends (at least in part) on corporate governance species. There is, in other 
words, a circular causation process between politics and corporate governance. 
Moreover, such a process is characterised by a Lamarckian evolution that takes into 
account purposive variations: agents support (e.g., vote for) politics that are aligned 
with their interests. 
This article contributes to the literature and the debate with respect to the following two 
main aspects. First, it reconciles and reorganises different and heterogeneous 
contributions concerning political determinants of corporate governance. This 
reconciliation can be useful to understand but also to predict the evolution of corporate 
governance. In particular, one should expect a convergence of corporate governance 
structures solely if we expect a convergence of political conditions. Secondly, the article 
sheds light on the selection of institutions by including a Lamarckian artificial selection. 
In the Darwinian theory, but also in the evolutional economic theory (which borrows 
from Darwin and evolutionary biology), individuals are ‘fixed/exogenous types’: their 
rational decisions stand only for rational adaptation to a given environment, and 
changes occur only through random mutations or alien invasions. In contrast, this paper 
takes into account an idea of Lamarckian artificial selection: individuals have the 
opportunities to change (and not only to adapt to) their environment, and such changes 
are in accordance with their economic maximisation objectives. 
Darwinism is a possible inspiration for economics (so as economics inspired 
Darwinism6). A growing body of literature indicates that the evolution of economic 
institutions shares some of the complicated intellectual challenges that characterise the 
Darwinian evolution of species in biology (e.g. Vromen 1995; Roe 1996; Hodgson 
1999; Nicita and Pagano 1999; Samuelson 2002; Pagano 2012). In particular, the article 
applies three main Darwinian principles: variation, inheritance, and selection. 7  In 
accordance with Darwin, there must be sustained and abundant variations among the 
members of a species––in biology, variations involve genetic recombination. Second, 
there must be some mechanism through which characteristics are passed on via heredity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Roe and Vatiero (2016) illustrate some limit of this approach based on politics. Among others, too many political 
explanations are local and historical.  
6 Darwin credited economists, e.g. Thomas Malthus and Adam Smith, for their crucial influence on the formulation 
of his theory (cf. Gould 1993).  
7 For instance, Darwin writes:  
[o]wing to this struggle for life, any variation, however slight and from whatever cause proceeding, if it be in any 
degree profitable to an individual of any organic beings and to external nature, will tend to the preservation of that 
individual, and will generally be inherited by its offspring. The offspring, also, will thus have a better chance of 
surviving, for, of the many individuals of any species which are periodically born, but a small number can survive. 
I have called this principle, by which each slight variation, if useful, is preserved, by the term of natural selection. 
(Darwin 1859 in 2004:74, italics is added).	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through the generations––in biology, heredity involves genes and DNA. Third, a 
selective mechanism (e.g. natural selection) operates because the variations that are 
preserved are those bestowing an advantage in the struggle to survive. 
Darwinian principles of variation, inheritance, and selection may include many different 
economic perspectives. For instance, Alchian (1950) argued that uncertainty and 
innovation fuel variation and that competition selects the firms that make profits.8 
Nelson and Winter (1982, 2002) affirm that imitation, habit, and routine produce 
heredity in the industry and that managers select among observed behaviour patterns. 
Chandler (1977) argues that the emergence in the US of modern large companies, 
characterised by managerial hierarchy, derives from both technological and institutional 
variations in the US (that did not occur in the EU); respectively, the exponential 
expansion of transportation and the communication industry between the end of the 19th 
century and the beginning of the 20th century, and the introduction of antitrust policies 
(cf. also Williamson 1985: 107-114). 
The Darwinian principles (variation, heredity, and selection) in this article are reflected, 
respectively, by politics-driven institutional shocks, complementarities among 
institutional domains that lead to path-dependence phenomena, and the emergence (i.e. 
selection) of multiple Nash equilibrium profiles. Moreover, the analysis embraces the 
co-evolution between corporate governance (i.e. species) and politics (its environment), 
by including a Lamarckian approach.  
The rest of paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the motivation and 
furnishes the main ideas of the paper. Section 3 applies the Darwinian principle of 
variations to the corporate governance analysis, by focusing on political variations due 
to working-class pressures. Section 4 illustrates the parallel between the Darwinian 
principle of inheritance and economic concepts of path-dependence and institutional 
complementarity. The study of selection is presented in Section 5: In this section, I 
illustrate a parallel between ‘artificial’ selection and political equilibrium. Section 6 is 
dedicated to remarks.   
 
 
2. Motivation and intuition  
 
While the ‘Modigliani and Miller Theorem’ asserts that in the absence of capital market 
imperfections and taxation, firm value is independent of financial structure, in the real 
world with positive transaction costs, the financial structure matters because it 
contributes to the definition of the costs and benefits of the corporate governance 
structures. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) summarise corporate diversity in terms of the 
mechanisms available to minimise agency problems. In the diffused shareholder 
species, the separation between ownership and control calls for institutional 
mechanisms, such as a market for corporate control and contractual incentives, to align 
the interests of anonymous shareholders and managers. In contrast, in the blockholder 
species, the majority shareholder retains a greater capacity to exercise direct control on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For a similar view of natural selection by Milton Friedman and Gary Becker, see Vromen (1995: 13-40). 
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management; this produces fewer market-oriented rules (e.g. takeovers), weaker 
managerial incentives, and a greater supply of debt than the diffused shareholder 
species. As a result, whereas in the blockholder species, non-dominant shareholders 
may suffer from potential misbehaviour of the blockholder, in the diffused shareholder 
species, dispersed shareholders may suffer from managerial misbehaviour (Roe 2005). 
Even if the agency cost theory may furnish an explanation of why different species 
might in theory converge (e.g. it could derive from the competition among corporations 
with different governance structures), it does not investigate the origin of the 
diversity—namely, why two (or more) corporate governance species emerge(d)—and 
why different species might in practice not converge (e.g. for the emergence of multiple 
equilibrium profiles, or divergence of political determinants). 
The Darwinian argument as proposed here and applied to the analysis of corporate 
governance structures, in particular, is able to revise three crucial predictions of the 
current literature:  
1. The prediction of convergence: Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) predict the 
convergence towards a shareholder-oriented model in which managers should be 
charged with the obligation to follow the interests of shareholders.9 The idea is that 
the diffused shareholder species is the inevitable path for all countries.10  
2. The prediction of efficiency: The competition in product-and-capital markets should 
force corporations, and in particular big corporations that operate in the international 
markets, to adopt rules, including corporate-governance mechanisms, that minimise 
costs in the drive for efficiency. The prediction is that firms with competitive 
advantages under the most efficient structure of corporate governance should 
displace those governed by alternative-governance structures. This is the functional 
explanation of institutions (cf. Vromen 1995) as a means of minimising transaction 
costs (what Williamson 1985 calls the ‘Efficiency Branch’).  
3. The prediction of legal origin: In a series of articles, Shleifer and his co-authors 
(LLSV) seek to show that the current corporate governance species originates from 
the medieval distinction between common and civil law systems:11 This article 
illustrates that such an explanation can be included in an idea of political origin and 
can be extended by involving further political determinants.  
Ultimately, this article is sceptical about arguments that predict convergence towards a 
single model and, above all, towards a single optimal equilibrium. In particular, 
institutional complements12 can conceivably determine the best-fitting (rather than 
most-efficient) corporate governance system, and therefore systems will (continue to) 
differ depending on which local complement dominates. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Further corporate constituencies, such as creditors, employees, suppliers, and customers will have their interests 
protected by contractual and regulatory means rather than through participation in corporate governance 
10 The hypothesis of convergence is advanced also by Easterbrook and Fischel (1991), and Pagano and Volpin 
(2006). 
11 In particular, the legal origin theory affirms that common-law systems protect shareholders and creditors (and 
therefore lead to diffused corporate ownership) better than civil-law countries do. By the late 2000s, important 
policy-makers at international development agencies such as the World Bank had based their policy 
recommendations on this theory  (cf. Roe 2006; Deakin and Pistor 2012). 
12 Two institutions are complementary when the ‘performance’ of one institution benefits from the presence of 
another institution and vice versa (cf. also Pagano and Vatiero 2014). 
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Research questions concern the following: (i) why a clear convergence towards one 
corporate governance species has not naturally occurred thus far; (ii) why different 
corporate governance species may survive; and (iii) why the legal origin theory is 
insufficient to explain the diversity of corporate governance species. The thesis 
advanced in this paper is that corporate diversity is the result of an evolution deriving 
from the inheritance (i.e. path-dependence) of several variations of political 
environments, which leads to the (Lamarckian) selection of multiple, sometimes 
inefficient, and local equilibria.  
In the process of their evolution, biological systems carry the baggage of their own 
history. Hence, in order to understand the nature of an organism, we must know 
something about its evolutionary past. Analogously, corporate governance everywhere 
continues to bear the imprint of the historical path through which it has evolved, and 
reflects as well the influence of a variety of (non-efficiency-oriented) political 
determinants. The general idea in Figure 1 is that history affects politics, where politics 
involves many aspects such as ideologies, systems of government, and political parties. 
Politics defines policies about different aspects of life such as health policies, foreign 
policies, etc. Some of these policies, i.e.	   economic policies, affect the corporate 
governance species. Hence, corporate governance depends on the policies and on the 
politics that shape those policies. Political conditions directly or indirectly (by policies) 
affect economic outcomes, i.e. the corporate governance species (Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. The evolution from politics to corporate governance species, and back 
 
An example of these relationships is provided by LLSV. Because France in the 12th and 
13th centuries was less peaceful than England, in France there was a greater need for 
protection and control of law enforcers by the state––consequently, French politics 
adopted a civil law system characterised by fact-finding by state-employed judges and, 
later, a reliance on codes rather than judicial discretion. In contrast, English politics 
developed a common law system that relied on fact-finding by juries, independent 
judges, and judge-made law rather than strict codes (see Glaeser and Shleifer 2002; Roe 
2007; Siems 2007). Accordingly, political (broadly speaking) and medieval variations 
between France and England produced different jural systems, which in turn affect 
current economic outcomes. 
Moreover, my work, by analysing politics-driven variations, takes into account the 
circularity between politics/policies and corporate governance species (Figure 1), 
namely the co-evolution between the species (i.e. the corporation) and its environment 
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(i.e. the political context). The idea is that the corporate governance species calls for 
certain policies and prefers certain politics: constituents of the corporation (i.e. workers, 
managers, and owners) as voters, interest groups, and/or lobbyists support policies and 
politics that are best aligned with their interests (e.g. shareholders seek high dividends, 
workers seek good wages and job stability, and managers seek autonomy and prestige). 
Moreover, such preferences change over time: for instance, the progress of financial 
markets and corporate governance configurations implied the expansion of ‘specialised’ 
interest groups, such as the rise of the coalition of managers.  
In particular, I focus on two channels through which is expressed the influence of 
corporate governance species on politics: the first is based on the class conflicts and 
coalitions between workers and owners, while the second is based on the cross-class 
conflicts and coalitions among agents of the same innovation sector. Hence, there is a 
mutual dependence between politics and policies on the one hand, and economic 
outcomes (namely, the corporate governance species) on the other hand. Such a 
dependence represents a form of co-evolution between species (the corporate 
governance structure) and environment (political context). 
The circular (and cumulative) causation process or path-dependence between politics 
and corporate governance means that the species (i.e. corporate governance) adapts to 
the environment (i.e. the political context) and the environment in turn adapts to its 
species. In this sense, the actual species inherited characteristics both of past species 
and the past environment. This circularity may lead to an equilibrium in terms of 
adaptation, and such an equilibrium leads to the definition of the economic species. This 
does not mean that path-dependence is always inefficient, but that institutional 
complementarities may not engender a tendency towards systemic efficiency because 
these complementarities produce different and often (in)efficient economic equilibria 
(Aoki 2001; Milgrom and Roberts 1990).13  
In addition, in Darwinian theory, ‘natural selection’ stands for an idea of local or partial 
efficiency. Darwin refers to natural selection as any attribute that favours survival, such 
as a better use of resources, a better adaptation to weather and climate, superior 
resistance to diseases, or a greater ability to escape enemies. It means that ‘nature’ 
selects the most well-adapted and most fitting species according to the local 
environment, and not the most efficient in an absolute sense. It implies the emergence 
and persistence of corporate governance arrangements that are the best-fitting for an 
environment, but not necessarily the most-efficient.  
Finally, the concept of selection in this paper also includes human reasons rather than 
natural ones: one can say that institutions are selected by people, not by nature. Indeed, 
institutions change because individuals are moved by an effort to realise their 
aspirations via politics. This means that the evolution of institutions in general and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Although this paper will focus on the institutional complementarity argument, multiple and local equilibria may 
emerge for a further argument that is based upon the convexity property. The causation between environment and 
species, both in biology and in economy, may potentially violate the nonconvexity property. As in biology, many 
pathways of interactions among constituents of ecosystems involve transformation possibilities that constitute 
nonconvex sets (this circumstance is known in biology as ‘fitness landscape’), so in the perspective of this paper, the 
interactions among constituents of corporations (i.e. managers, workers, and shareholders) and between the 
corporation and its environment may potentially violate the convexity property. This violation may make more 
difficult the achievement/selection of efficient outcomes, as in the case of externalities and nonconvex properties (e.g. 
see Starrett 1972). I am indebted to an anonymous referee for this idea.  
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corporate governance in particular is characterised by a Lamarckian mechanism because 
the members of species (e.g. constituents of corporations) consciously and purposively 
affect their environment. In biology, there are no Lamarckian species or ‘artificial’ 
selection, while in socio-economic systems, agents can, and apparently do, purposively 
(i.e. artificially) modify the underlying codes (their environment) that enable 
meaningful social interactions.14 One might affirm that interest groups via politics can 
produce inefficient corporate governance species. However, the aim of this article is not 
to assess the efficiency of one particular species of corporate governance rather than 
another; it is interested in arguing that multiple equilibrium profiles may emerge and 
that the corporate governance of large corporations is the result of a political selection 
rather than a ‘natural’ convergence towards Pareto optimality.  
 
 
3. The political variations 
 
In accordance with politics-school, political forces account for the differences in choice 
of corporate governance species among advanced industrial countries: political 
conditions precede corporate governance.  
A first example of political variation that affects the current economic outcome is 
described by legal origin theory (LLSV). From the differences in political context 
between France and England in the 12th and 13th centuries, two legal families have 
appeared: common law and civil law. According to LLSV, this distinction between 
legal families led to different qualities of protection for shareholders, and, above all, to 
different structures of corporate governance.  
Several scholars are sceptical that the medieval variation illustrated by the legal origin 
theory is sufficient15 to explain the variety of corporate governance structures around 
the world. Indeed, it is difficult for legal origin with its time-invariant nature to explain 
financial change over time (La Porta et al. 2008 admit such difficulty). It implies 
invariable influence of legal origins over financial development. Similarly, Roe (2003, 
2006) noted that the politics in LLSV’s argumentation exists only in the initial 
(medieval) choice of the legal system (common vs. civil law) and no longer plays a role 
in shaping the actual content or use of law after the initial choice of systems. In this 
respect, the historical distinction between the common law and civil law systems 
considered by the legal-origin theory can represent only one part of the evolution of 
corporate governance regimes and not the entire history. 
The politics-school explanation of the variety of corporate governance regimes goes 
beyond the notable legal-origin theory and suggests several politically-driven variations. 
The proposed Darwinian approach is able to reconcile these different contributions. In 
accordance with the politics-school’s thought, the question is whether the dominant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 A widespread accusation against the Darwinian account of evolution is that it is blind (e.g. Coase 1978). However, 
Darwinism does not deny intentionality or Lamarckism; it simply insists that it has evolved in a causal process, and 
that intentions themselves are caused (Hodgson and Knudsen 2006). 
15 And robust! See Spamann (2010), Siems (2014), and Holderness (2014). See also Vatiero (2015), which illustrates 
that the legal origin theory weakly explains the Swiss corporate governance species.  
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interests in a polity have reason to favour or disfavour a corporate structure. From here, 
the political theory comes in several major formulations, such as the median voter 
theory (Perotti and von Thadden 2006), the role of ideology (Roe 1994), the left-right 
conflict (Roe 2003), the dominant coalition characteristics (Gourevitch and Shinn 
2005), and the nature of political representation (Pagano and Volpin 2005). Each theory 
furnishes substantial consistent empirical data.  
Perotti and von Thadden (2006) offer evidence of the “great reversal” phenomenon 
noted by Rajan and Zingales, stressing that in the first half of the 20th century, due to 
hyperinflation in several financially developed countries, the middle class became 
concerned with the labour-income risk associated with free markets. Those countries 
(such as Germany) with an impoverished middle class turned to a more corporatist 
system with a suppressed financial market, whereas other countries (e.g. the US) 
escaped high inflation and hence maintained more market-friendly institutions, despite 
the fact that some of them, such as the Netherlands and Switzerland, have the ‘wrong’ 
legal system origin (i.e. civil law).  
Roe (1994, 2003, 2006) explores the idea that the American and European corporate 
governance species are the result of political variations (i.e. the visible hand of politics). 
In the case of the US, for Roe (1994) the populism and federal system favoured smaller 
local interests over concentrated private (economic) power, which in turn affected 
American finance and the structure of the country’s large firms. The result was that 
banks and insurers were not players in American corporate ownership, pushing the large 
firm to grow not via one-stop shopping at a major financial institution, but via diffuse 
securities markers. On the other hand, in Continental Europe, Roe (2003) affirms that 
the corporate governance species derives from the pressure of the working class, which 
called for workers’ representation, job security, income distribution, social welfare, and 
social stability, to name a few. These variations among policies on labour (versus 
capital) were due to 20th century World Wars, occupation, and communist influence. In 
particular, “social democracies”,16 such as those in Continental Europe, pressured 
corporate managers and gave voice to the claims of workers. Roe (2003) adds that 
social democratic policies increased the incentives to concentrate ownership in 
corporations. That is, owners of capital responded by concentrating ownership to ensure 
that managers act in the interests of the firm’s owners rather than giving away the store 
to workers.  
A different view is proposed by Gourevitch and Shinn (2005). They affirm that the 
corporate governance practices are the result of coalitions among corporate actors (cf. 
also March 1962). For instance, the coalition of workers and managers can dominate 
owners, as in corporatist states, such as Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands. Or, the 
recent introductions of shareholder value practices in stakeholder-oriented governance 
contexts suggest a coalition of employees and investors to promote greater 
transparency.  
In addition, divergences of corporate governance regimes may be the result of the 
political mechanisms of preference aggregation rather than of political preferences. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 By social democracy, Roe (2003) means a nation committed to private property, but where distributional 
considerations are vital, where labour is typically powerful, and where government action to foster economic equality 
is central on the political agenda.	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Pagano and Volpin (2005) affirm that insiders at large enterprises are aligned together 
against outsiders. The insiders are those owning large blocks of the company’s stock, 
the firm’s managers, and its employees. They unite to oppose the influence of outside 
stockholders and, hence, do not support corporate and securities law protections that 
would facilitate outside investors’ participation, protection, and voice. The three do not 
vote for the same political party, but their parliamentary representatives make deals that 
unite their interests. The intuition behind these results is that proportional voting pushes 
political parties to cater more to the preferences of social groups with homogeneous 
interests; for instance, managers and employees. Under a majoritarian system, by 
contrast, there is keen competition for the votes of the pivotal district, that is, a district 
dominated by a group that is not ideologically committed, like anonymous 
shareholders.17 Hence, the findings of Pagano and Volpin suggest that a proportional 
system produces weak shareholder protection and strong employment protection, i.e. an 
outcome favourable to managers and workers and unfavourable to the dispersed owner. 
In contrast, a majoritarian system produces the opposite: strong shareholder protection 
and weak employment protection, i.e. the outcome preferred by diffused shareholders.18  
 
 
4. Inheritance: path-dependences and institutional complements 
 
In biology, there must be some mechanism by which adaptive solutions are copied or 
passed on. This is the basis of the Darwinian principle of inheritance, which refers to a 
broad class of mechanisms by which adaptations are retained, preserved, passed on, or 
copied through time. In economics, Darwinian inheritance reflects the concepts of path-
dependence and institutional complements. These concepts furnish the opportunity to 
apply an evolutionary approach to describe the emergence of multiple corporate 
governance equilibria: since different institutional environments exist, different 
corporate governance species emerge, and the best-fitting (rather than the most-
efficient) species will survive.  
In accordance with Roe (2003), Ahlering and Deakin (2007), Aoki (2001), Gelter 
(2009), Gospel and Pendleton (2005), Belloc and Pagano (2013), and Pagano (2012), 
countries characterised by stronger protection for employees’ legal and political rights 
tend to have more concentrated corporate ownership arrangements. In other words, 
owners may react to a higher participation of labour in the control of companies 
(determined by politics) by creating a higher concentration of corporate ownership in 
order to safeguard their quasi-rents. This is the explanation of the emergence of the 
European corporations characterised by a structure with a higher level of capital 
concentration and workers’ voice. This suggests a causality relation running from 
workers’ protection to corporate ownership arrangements.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 A similar argument is in Iversen and Soskice (2006) and Mueller (2006).  
18 As noted by Boix (1999), the evolution of electoral rules predicts the evolution of working-class pressures: the 
proportional representation was adopted in those countries in which the new entrant (the Left party) was strong, while 
the ex-ante plurality/majority system survived in those countries in which the Left party was weak.  
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In graph 1, we use corporate ownership data on the 20 largest firms (20% cutoff) from La Porta et al. (1999)19 
and the employment protection index, referring to the year 1995, from OECD (2013). The 23 countries 
analysed are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
the UK, and the US.  𝑦 = 0,1844 + 0,1873 ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝐼; R-Square: 0,37441; p-value < 2%; n. obs.: 23. 
Graph 1. The complementarity between labour protection (EPI) and corporate ownership 
 
However, causation may run in the reverse, as well: a certain degree of concentration of 
owners’ interests may easily encourage some sort of worker reaction in terms of higher 
employment protection. In particular, the concentration of ownership in the capital 
market may urge employees to call for protection via politics. That is, a past increase in 
the participation of labour in the control of large companies implies a future 
concentration of corporate ownership; and a past increase of concentration of corporate 
ownership causes a future request by employees of more voice in the corporation. 
Graph 1 illustrates this correlation between the domain of corporate ownership and 
employment protection. 
In addition, one recent piece of literature affirms that the type of corporate governance 
is complementary to the type of innovation (Carlin and Mayer 2000, 2003; Mayer 2000; 
Hall and Soskice 2001; Gospel and Pendleton 2005; and Pagano 2012). In short, 
corporate governance can be seen as a technology similar to a manufacturing technique 
or, even better, an inventory management system: ‘Armed’ corporate governance, such 
as examples in Europe, as characterised by large shareholders and a high level of 
workers’ protection, supports activities with a ‘modular’ step-by-step progression (i.e. 
incremental innovation) that require ‘cooperation’ among stakeholders. On the other 
hand, a ‘disarmed’ species of corporate governance, such as that in the US, 
characterised by dispersed owners and weak employee protections, stimulates all-or-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 It would be useful to check the results illustrated in Graphs 1 and 2 with additional (and more recent) data. 
Unfortunately, corporate ownership data sources have many mistakes and, above all, there is no clean off-the-shelf 
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nothing innovation (i.e. radical innovation), providing greater flexibility of work and of 
capital.  
 
In graph 2, we focus on corporate ownership data on the 20 largest firms (20% cutoff) from La Porta et al. 
(1999) and on the radical specialisation index (see below). Twenty countries are analysed: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US. 𝑦 = 0,9577 − 0,3761 ∗ 𝑅𝑆𝐼 ; R-Square: 0,15612; p-value < 10%; n. obs.: 20. 
The radical specialisation index (RSI) denotes the specialism of a country in selected radical sectors 
(biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, medical technology, and computer technology) relative to selected 
incremental sectors (transport, civil engineering, and mechanical elements), by using data from the years 
2004-2013 on the number of granted patents by European Patent Offices. The index is calculated as follows:  
𝑅𝑆𝐼! = !"#$"%!!"#$"%! !"#!!"#! 
where 𝑖 indicates the country, 𝑛 all countries of the sample, and 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑑 and 𝑃𝑎𝑡 stand for, respectively, the 
number of patents in selected radical sectors, and the number of patents in all selected sectors. 
Graph 2. The complementarity between radical innovation (RSI) and corporate ownership 
 
The distinction of these two kinds of innovation is not based on long- or short-term 
returns (both sectors may require long-term investments), but on the effect of 
innovation. In the case of radical sectors, an innovation implies substantial shifts in 
production and the elaboration of novel goods. This can be seen in the information 
technology, pharmaceutical, biotechnology, chemistry, and medical sectors. In contrast, 
incremental innovations determine constant but small-scale improvements to existing 
products and production processes. This can be seen in the following sectors: transport, 
mechanical elements, electrical machinery, civil engineering, and chemical engineering. 
Hall and Soskice (2001) assert that the diffused shareholder species causes radical 
innovation, while the blockholder species causes incremental innovation. However, if 
the aforementioned causation exists from corporate governance to the development of a 
kind of innovative sector, it occurs both ways. Graph 2 illustrates this complementarity. 
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Nations characterised by radical innovations and productive factors (labour and capital) 
are more flexible. In contrast, in those nations with more developed incremental sectors 
than radical ones, economic agents require a higher level of protection and stability of 
their assets (both capital and labour). That is, while incremental sectors are based on 
committed assets (both capital and labour), radical sectors are characterised by more 
flexibility of assets. This is relevant for the definition of corporate governance 
equilibrium via politics: as it will be explained below, preferences and interests may 
follow the production technologies and, hence, can be dissimilar for owners in different 
sectors and for labour in different sectors (Hall and Soskice 2001). 
 
 
5. Selection: efficiency, equilibrium and artificiality 
 
Darwin destroyed the idea (on which the late-18th and early-19th century biology was 
based) of fixed species stemming from a timeless and universal Plan of Creation, and 
simultaneously swept away the claim to seek ahistorical laws of organic forms. On 
board the HMS Beagle, Darwin determined that some of the different species of 
Galapagos faunae had clearly descended from a single ancestral species and that these 
species had changed their form through descent with modification.20  
What Darwin called ‘natural selection’ refers to any attribute that favours survival, such 
as a better use of resources, a better adaptation to weather and climate, superior 
resistance to diseases, or a greater ability to escape enemies. Darwin’s choice of the 
word ‘selection’ was not particularly fortunate. It suggests some agent in nature who, 
being able to predict the future, selects ‘the best’ biological characteristics. This implies 
that what exists, that is what is selected, must be efficient.21 
But this is not what Darwinian selection is and does. Selection is not necessarily 
globally efficient and does not produce (near) optimal outcomes, nor is it convergent, 
nor globally stable as an equilibrium (cf. Dow 1987, Vromen 1995). Natural selection 
should not be too strongly equated with notions of perfection.22 The rejection of the 
belief in a world designed by a wise and benign Creator implied the rejection of the 
belief in a perfect/efficient world.  
Darwin refers to an idea of local or partial efficiency; that is, according to the local 
conditions and environment.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Darwin infrequently used the term ‘evolution’, but on the whole, he preferred phrases like ‘descent with 
modification’. An anonymous referee suggests that while in biology speciation arises from common ancestry—‘the 
tree of life’, corporate form is a forest and not a tree because there are many local origins. However, the common 
ancestry in this paper is represented by the small firm that decides to grow/modify into a large-sized firm in different 
forms (diffused shareholding vs. blockholding) along with the political environment.  
21 It seems to support an idea of selection process that leads to a convergence towards an efficient equilibrium:  
Much of the literature of corporate governance adopts a Darwinian view of organizations. Firms that survive in 
competitive markets are presumed to have optimal governance structures. Firms that fail to adapt their governance 
structures to changes in the business environment supposedly face extinction, leading to a natural selection of 
efficient organizational forms. (Kole and Lehn 1997: 421).  
22 The fact that the selection does not produce perfection was clear in Old-Institutionalists like Veblen and Commons, 
and it represents one of the main contrasts with (or, perhaps, one of the main limits of) Williamsonian New-
Institutional Economics (cf. Vromen 1985). 
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Natural selection tends only to make each organic being perfect as perfect as, or slightly 
more perfect than, the other inhabitants of the same country with which it has to struggle 
for existence. And we see that this is the degree of perfection attained under nature… 
Natural selection will not produce absolute perfection, nor do we always meet, as far as we 
can judge, with this high standard under nature. (Darwin 1859 in 2004:223, italics is added)  
Hence, “[e]volution cannot achieve engineering perfection because it must work with 
inherited parts available from previous histories in different contexts” (Gould 1985: 
210).  
In biology, the notion of species is simply expressed by saying that “at a given locality 
different populations coexist [and] do not interbreed with each other” (Mayr 1988: 318; 
cf. also Mayr 1991: 29). Note that the economic notion of equilibrium (i.e. Nash 
equilibrium) is quite similar: it is a circumstance of absence of incentives for any actor 
involved to unilaterally change his or her strategy/behaviour. Both the economic 
equilibrium and the biological species represent an idea of stability. But while in 
biology the environment is largely exogenous, in economics, there is a co-evolutionary 
process between corporate governance (i.e. species) and politics (its environment): 
namely, the environment affects the species but the reverse causation also holds.  
This co-evolution of politics and corporate governance is strictly related to an idea of 
artificiality of selection. Simple organisms cannot anticipate biological debacles; in 
contrast, humans are said to be subject to cultural evolution because intelligence allows 
us to anticipate and adapt to environmental changes. The institutionalist John R. 
Commons (1897, 1924) repeatedly proposed that institutional evolution involves 
‘artificial’ rather than ‘natural’ selection:  
The term ‘natural selection’ is a misnomer, as Darwin himself perceived.[23] It means 
merely survival. ‘Selection’ proper involves intention, and belongs to human reason. 
Selection by man we call artificial. (Commons 1897:90). 
The essential characteristic of artificial selection in accordance with Commons is that 
humans consciously manipulate the criteria or environment of selection; this is the case 
with politics.  
The equilibrium of corporate governance affects the politics because it concerns 
corporate decisions, which drive the creation and distribution of corporate surplus. 
Although voters cannot influence corporate choices directly (outside the state-owned 
sector), they may confer control rights to those investors whose interests are best 
aligned with their own, whether these are dispersed equity holders, banks, large 
shareholders, or the state. This indirect influence may be expressed by several channels. 
The first is based on the class conflicts between workers and owners, as noted by Mark 
Roe: workers’ interests and their political preferences conflict with owners’ interests 
and their political preferences. The second channel concerns sectors, by involving cross-
class conflicts as deriving from complementarity between innovation and corporate 
governance: interests follow the investment in innovation and therefore they may be 
different among members of the same social class—in particular different strategies for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 However, as Commons acknowledged, Darwin himself established the idea of artificial selection, which occurs 
when a human breeder selects strains of a plant or animal according to favoured attributes for further propagation. 
Hence, it would be a misunderstanding to view artificial selection as an alternative to natural selection (Hodgson 
2004, Hodgson and Knudsen 2006): artificial and natural selection are not mutually exclusive. 
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profit-maximising. 24  Countries with specialisation in incremental sectors are 
characterised by policies favouring blockholding and workers’ protection, while 
countries that specialise in radical innovations (politically) prefer reducing constraints 
to the flexibility of productive factors. Finally, mechanisms of preference aggregation 
matter (Pagano and Volpin 2005): proportional voting pushes political parties to cater 
more to the preferences of social groups with homogeneous preferences, e.g. insiders. 
Under a majoritarian system, by contrast, there is keen competition for the votes of the 
pivotal district, that is, the district dominated by a group that is not ideologically 




Figure 2. The equilibria between politics and business 
 
In this respect, three main causes of suboptimal equilibrium can be stated. The first one 
is bounded rationality.25 It means that individuals intend to bring about institutions that 
are aligned with their interests, but individuals cannot foresee what specific institutions 
will be most aligned with their interests—Williamson himself affirms that bounded 
rationality refers to behaviour that is “intendedly rational, but only limited so” 
(Williamson 1987: 618). Bounded rationality could bring about inefficient outcomes.26  
A second cause of sub-optimal equilibrium depends on institutional complementarity. 
For institutional complementarities, multiple Nash equilibria may emerge, and this may 
not engender a tendency towards systemic efficiency. Furthermore, because of 
institutional complementarities, small changes may have durable consequences on 
‘hybrid’ situations, e.g. a disequilibrium profile may set off a circular and cumulative 
causation process leading rapidly to an equilibrium. On the other hand, large changes 
may not produce institutional or economic readjustments because of the costs of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 More in detail, in accordance with varieties of capitalism theory as proposed by Hall and Soskice (2001), different 
political environments promote different decision-making structures within the firm and consequent different 
performance outcomes.  
25 The Lamarckian perspective is consistent with an idea of bounded rationality.  
26 The achievement of efficient equilibria under bounded rationality is more difficult if we also consider the 
nonconvexity property. Refer to Footnote 13.  
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switching from one equilibrium to another; in this case, the initial condition may have 
persistent ‘lock-in’ effects.  
A third cause is (again) politics-based. Politics serves particular interests rather than 
social efficiency. This is lucidly expressed by North (1990:16): “institutions are not 
necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient; rather, they, or at least the 
formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to 
devise new rules”.27 Since institutional changes are the outcome of strategies aimed at 
improving the situation of some or all components of the dominant elite, such changes 
will occur not only when they produce global efficiency improvements, but if they 
produce advantages for the dominant elite. Accordingly, large corporations and their 
governance are the result of a political selection more than a natural convergence 
towards Pareto optimality.  
Hence, differences among corporate governance regimes derive from the outcome of 
the political arena, and the differences in the political arena (at least in part) are based 
on the diversity of corporate governance species. Figure 2 summarises this paper’s 
general argument. History (e.g. hyperinflation, World War, etc.) created the conditions 
for pressures by interest groups over politics. Such political outcome has defined and 
continues to define policies: this article has focused on the circular causation between 
labour protection policies and corporate ownership, even if a similar argument can be 
advanced between market regulation and corporate ownership.28 In more detail, strong 
pressure from the working class brought about via politics the emergence of the 
blockholder species, such as the European corporate governance species. In contrast, in 
countries in which the working class pressure was weak (e.g. the US), a diffused 
shareholder species (still) persists. Finally, each corporate governance species supports 




6. Concluding remarks 
 
The Economist wrote:  
The debate over how companies are best governed is at least as old as companies 
themselves. That there is no one best system of governing them is suggested by the fact that 
the world’s greatest companies have grown up under a number of very different regimes. 
(The Economist, Idea: Corporate governance, 7th Sept 2009). 
At times, the German and Japanese model has performed very well, at other times not. 
At times, the US model has done superbly, at other times not. For instance, Jensen 
(1989) predicted the ‘eclipse’ of corporations with diffused shareholders and a move to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 There is, in fact, no mechanism that ensures that political processes will only produce and retain efficient 
arrangements (see Olson 1982). This may represent, in Acemoglu’s (2003) words, a failure of the ‘political Coase 
Theorem’. 
28 See Roe and Vatiero (2016). The general idea is that weaker product markets and the concomitant monopoly rents 
can affect corporate governance by establishing a fertile field where controlling shareholders can cooperatively split 
rents with incumbent workers. Thus, large owners and incumbent workers can ally politically in order to frustrate 
competition policy. 	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corporate ownership with high levels of debt. Some governance mechanisms fare better 
under certain economic and institutional conditions and worse under others. And 
conditions change. Changing circumstances alter the incentives that affect policy––the 
inducements to change or preserve the rules. Since countries vary in their internal 
political dynamics––institutions, preferences, parties, and interest groups––their policy 
outcomes vary, and thus their corporate governance systems will differ. This means 
that, if a convergence does occur, it will not be a natural process (i.e. natural selection), 
but it will depend on an ‘artificial’ evolution deriving from a convergence of politics 
among countries. 
This article employs Darwin’s theory to explain the origin and persistence of the 
diversity of corporate governance species. Complex population systems found in both 
nature and society face locally scarce resources and the problem of survival. These 
systems may include every population, from amoebas to humans, through economic 
institutions. In particular, there are three general principles common to both social and 
organic evolution: variation, inheritance, and selection. These Darwinian principles are 
able to explain forces that shape corporate governance and ownership around the world. 
This article has illustrated how Darwinian principles—variation, heredity, and 
selection—may be related to three economic issues concerning the evolution of 
corporate governance. These are, respectively, 1) institutional shocks and their 
dependency on politics; 2) the path-dependence argument; and 3) the emergence of 
multiple equilibria. This leads to the (Lamarckian) selection of multiple, local, and 
inefficient equilibria. This article argues that the biological approach works well in 
explaining the political origins (of diversity) of the corporate governance species.  
Similar to the tortoises, finches, and iguanas of the Galapagos Islands of Darwin’s book, 
so (quite similarly) the species of corporate governance are the result of the selection of 
advantageous attributes inherited from past local variations. However, unlike the 
inhabitants of the Galapagos Islands, (the members of) corporate governance species are 
able to affect its environment, i.e. the politics. This co-evolution between politics and 
corporate governance accounts for the institutional and economic diversity among 
advanced industrial countries. 
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